Abstract-Workers who lose their jobs can become reemployed either by being recalled to their previous employers or by finding new jobs. Workers' chances for recall should depress their job search intensity, so the rates of exit from unemployment by these two routes should be negatively related. We look for evidence in the PSID data by estimating a semiparametric competing risks model with explicitly related hazards. Our estimates reveal a statistically precise but small negative effect of recall probabilities on the rate of new job finding.
I. Introduction
W ORKERS who lose their jobs can become reemployed either by being recalled to their previous employers or by finding new jobs. Each of these routes out of unemployment has merited the attention of researchers interested in how quickly job losers return to employment. Although intuition, as well as casual observation, suggests that workers' prospects for being recalled should influence how hard they search for new jobs and which offers they are willing to take, the empirical literature on the topic has generally proceeded without taking explicit account of this interaction. Katz (1986) recognized that the negative duration dependence observed in the overall rate of exit from unemployment could be due partly to negative duration dependence in the recall hazard masking positive dependence in the new job hazard. He estimated a competing risks duration model that allowed for both routes out of unemployment, assuming independent Weibull hazard functions and no unobserved heterogeneity, and found positive duration dependence in the new job hazard (see also Pichelmann & Riedel, 1992) . Han and Hausman (1990) demonstrated that the Weibull assumption was overly restrictive. They estimated a semiparametric competing risks model with a flexible baseline hazard function. In addition, they allowed the two types of risks to be correlated. While they found no statistically significant relationship between the two hazard rates, they did find that with their more flexible specification, there was no evidence of positive duration dependence in the new job hazard.
However, neither Katz nor Han and Hausman attempt to explicitly incorporate the interaction between the two routes out of unemployment, nor did they take into account unobserved heterogeneity as such. In this paper, we propose an improved specification that incorporates both these features. In particular, our econometric framework allows us to test for a direct relationship between the two risks and introduces unobserved heterogeneity along the lines of Heckman and Singer (1984) . In addition, we remain loyal to the initial mixed proportional hazard specification, whereas Han and Hausman deviated from their initial model in the competing risks setting by assuming that certain transformations of T 1 and T 2 follow a bivariate normal distribution, thus avoiding the bivariate extreme value distribution which would naturally follow from the initial assumption of the proportional hazard model.
We find evidence of an economically small, albeit statistically significant, negative relationship between the recall and new job hazards, leaving in some doubt the negative influence of recall prospects on new job search behavior.
Like the current work, both Katz (1986) and Han and Hausman (1990) estimated the objective probability of recall, but lacked any direct measure of workers' subjective probabilities of recall. In contrast, Katz and Meyer (1990) and Anderson (1992) estimated competing risks models in which self-reported recall expectations enter the new job hazard function as a covariate. Both of these latter studies found that workers' initial expectations of recall severely depressed the rate at which workers found new jobs, and that this effect diminished over the course of a spell of unemployment. We view this research and our own work, in which we infer recall expectations from observed recall rates, as alternative approaches to studying the relationship between recall expectation and new job search behavior.
Each approach has its advantages. On the one hand, data on recall expectations allow workers' subjective probabilities (which drive search behavior) to differ from observed probabilities and do not suffer from quite the difficulties of identification that will be an issue in our work. On the other hand, currently available data sets that include a measure of recall expectations are limited in scope (for example, including only recipients of unemployment insurance benefits), include only binary measures of recall expectations, and measure these expectations only at the beginning of the spell, with little indication of how those subjective probabilities may change as the spell progresses. Moreover, given the survey question from which the data on recall expectations are drawn, it is not clear what is meant when a respondent says that she "expects" to be recalled. Both the level of confidence and the time frame in which she expects to be recalled are ambiguous, which makes interpretation difficult (see section VI).
II. Model
Taking into account his chances for recall, an unemployed worker chooses how much effort to put into searching for a new job, and how choosy to be. If he takes a new job too early, he sacrifices the chance of returning to his previous employer. But the longer he waits before taking a new job, the more income he forgoes. The optimal search strategy is a solution to the stochastic optimal control problem that trades off the conflicting objectives of (i) minimizing search costs and preserving human capital and (ii) minimizing the length of the unemployment spell and thus reducing the earnings forgone.
Under a set of standard assumptions, 1 one can show that the optimal search strategy of an unemployed worker over time is characterized by theorem 1, and that one unemployed worker's optimal search intensity is different from another's when the two are faced with different recall hazard rates; as stated in theorem 2. The observed unemployment duration will be the minimum of the time to recall and the time to accepting a new job. Our goal is to estimate this joint distribution. We assume that the worker cannot affect her probability of being recalled, except by accepting a new job. Thus, the time to recall is exogenous, but the time to accepting a new job is endogenous and influenced by the prospects for recall. Accordingly, the observed duration is most suitably characterized by a dependent competing risks duration model. However, although the negative relationship between the two risks may be clear in theory, in practice the observed relationship between the recall and new job hazard rates may stem from a source other than workers' optimal search behavior: the direct effect of heterogeneity across individuals. That is, there are differences across workers in characteristics and circumstances that cause their hazard rates to move together.
On the one hand, if "better" workers will be quicker than "poorer" workers both to be recalled and to find new jobs, then the relationship between the two hazard rates induced directly by heterogeneity should be positive. Similarly, a worker disemployed during a boom may face a higher recall probability, and also will find a new job more easily, than an otherwise identical worker disemployed during a recession.
On the other hand, if prospective new employers are reluctant to hire workers laid off from the types of jobs that tend to engage in temporary layoffs and subsequent recalls, then the relationship between the two hazard rates induced directly by heterogeneity should be negative. Or a worker with a large amount of firm-specific human capital may face higher recall but lower new job hazard rates than a worker with more general skills.
Thus, although the theoretical relationship between the two hazard rates should be negative, heterogeneity itself can generate a relationship in either direction.
The negative theoretical relationship between the two hazards should manifest itself in two ways: through the dependence of the overall level of an individual's new job hazard on the overall level of the individual's recall hazard, and through the dependence of the change in his new job hazard over the course of an unemployment spell on the change in his recall hazard over the course of the same spell. The distinction is reminiscent of between-group variation versus within-group variation in the standard decomposition of variance, if one interprets a group as the weeks constituting an individual spell of unemployment. For this reason, it would be easier to identify the theoretical relationship between the two hazard rates if we observed many unemployment spells for each individual. However, as is typically the case, in our data we observe many individuals for only one spell (and often only part of that).
The trick, then, is to find a way to separately identify the cross-sectional relationship arising directly from heterogeneity and the theoretical relationship that arises from the worker's reaction to that heterogeneity. In the empirical model presented below, we employ two additional assumptions to enhance identifiability of the model, beyond the standard assumptions of the proportional hazard model. 2 First, we allow both measured and unmeasured individual heterogeneity to generate any pattern of cross-sectional relationships between the two hazard rates by letting individual and job characteristics enter into the recall and new job hazard functions with free coefficients, and by introducing random variables representing unobserved heterogeneity into both hazard functions without restricting their correlation across the hazards. However, we allow only a single combined effect of the recall hazard rate on the new job hazard rate, since it is only this total recall hazard, not its individual determinants, that ought to influence new job search behavior.
Second, we assume that workers unemployed due to plant closings or to the ending of seasonal or temporary jobs have no recall prospects and are aware that they have none. Econometrically, this restriction serves the same purpose as the more typical exclusion restrictions in a two-equation system, by forcing these variables to have a known influence on the recall hazard while not restricting their influence on the new job hazard.
Let z ϭ {z 1 , z 2 , . . .} denote a collection of observed individual and job characteristics affecting the recall and new job hazard rates in weeks {1,2, . . .} after the loss of a job. Let e and v denote two possibly correlated random variables capturing unmeasured heterogeneity in the recall and the new job hazard rates, respectively. The term z controls for observed heterogeneity, whereas e and v are intended to account for remaining individual differences. Higher draws of e and v mean that the corresponding worker faces a better chance of recall and finding a new job, respectively.
Workers who lost their jobs due to plant closings or the ending of seasonal or temporary jobs are assumed to face a recall hazard rate of 0 throughout their unemployment spell (with a few exceptions, described in footnote 6 below). To distinguish these workers from those who may have recall prospects, we define an indicator variable 1 nohope , which takes value 1 if the worker was dismissed due to either plant closing or ending of seasonal or temporary job and 0 otherwise. These workers will presumably start searching for new jobs immediately after becoming unemployed.
Consider a worker characterized by a vector (z,e,v) . We model the recall hazard rate of this worker as
where the value of 1 nohope can be determined from information in z, and x t is a subset of z t influencing the recall hazard rate at week t for potentially recallable workers.
A realization of z and e defines a conditional distribution of T r through the conditional recall hazard rate r (t͉z,e) . This specification has the form of a mixed proportional hazard model. The (mixed) proportionality part, (1-1 nohope )exp(x t ␤ϩe), controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. The proportional hazard assumption reduces the duration dependence of recall hazard rate for each individual worker to the duration dependence of the common baseline hazard function, simplifying the task of testing assumptions about duration dependence. 3 To anticipate our description of the data in section IV, the observed heterogeneity term z includes numerous socioeconomic variables, year dummies, three region dummies, seven industry dummies, and five occupation dummies. Additionally, z includes a dummy variable for whether the worker received unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, and its interaction with each of two benefit exhaustion points at 26 and 39 weeks. These interaction terms serve to control for spikes in the exit rates observed in our data for UI recipients (as in Katz or Han and Hausman) .
To capture the theoretical implication that the new job hazard rate "reacts" to the recall hazard rate, we explicitly model the new job hazard rate as a function of the recall hazard rate. Any other duration dependence in the new job hazard rate will be captured by a baseline hazard rate for new jobs. Thus we can test for any time pattern in the new job hazard rate that remains after controlling for the effect of changing recall hazard rate and the effects of measured and unmeasured heterogeneity. Specifically, we model the new job hazard rate as
Observed heterogeneity appears anew in the new job hazard specification, with its own set of coefficients, as one would not expect the effects of worker and job characteristics on recall and new job finding to be the same. For example, union members may be more likely to be recalled, but less likely to find new jobs. We allow for this differential impact for all variables. Also, to see whether job losses due to plant closings or the ending of seasonal or temporary jobs have an effect on speeding up new job search in addition to their influence via the recall hazard rate, we allow z to include plant closing status and temporary/seasonal status in addition to the variables in x. To control for unobserved heterogeneity in the new job hazard rate, we include another discrete random variable v, which may be correlated with e. The correlation between e and v, if any, would reflect the nontheoretical relationship between the recall and new job hazard rates arising from unmeasured heterogeneity.
The introduction of a ⅐ (1 Ϫ 1 nohope )r 0 (t)e x t ␤ as an argument in the new job hazard specification is intended to capture one of the major implications of the optimal search behavior described earlier. We introduce this term under the assumption that agents know their overall recall chances-to the extent that it is determined by measured heterogeneity-and react to this knowledge when looking for new jobs. We assume that agents do not know the realization of e and thus do not react to this term. This assumption is, of course, open to question, but is not critical to our results.
If a turns out to be negative, it implies that a laid-off worker whose chance of recall is lower is, in response, more enthusiastic about finding a new job and searches more intensely or with a lower reservation wage. The lower probability of recall may derive from the time that has elapsed since the layoff, or from unfavorable individual or job characteristics; the effect is the same. In the extreme case, workers who lost their jobs due to plant closings or the ending of temporary jobs exhibit the strongest reaction because they have no chance of being recalled throughout their spells of unemployment.
We are also interested in seeing whether r 0 (t) and j 0 (t) display any duration dependence of their own. If our job search theory is a reasonable description of behavior, then the theoretical relationship between the recall hazard rate and the new job hazard rate should be captured through the negative coefficient of a. But we have no particular expectation for a remaining temporal pattern in j 0 (t), once we control for (1 Ϫ 1 nohope )r 0 (t)e x t ␤ in the specification of the new job hazard rate.
To save on the number of parameters to be estimated, we restricted the recall and new job baseline hazard functions each to be a step function, with the number of steps considerably smaller than the number of weeks in the duration data. Also, to avoid odd behavior in the estimated baseline hazard functions due to the sparsity of observations at longer durations, we right-censored any observations whose reported duration is longer than or equal to sixty weeks. The lengths of the steps are identical for the two hazard functions. After considerable experimentation, we chose a step function with twelve steps: the first three steps are each two weeks long, the second three are each three weeks long, the third three are each four weeks long, and the final three are each eleven weeks long. The lengths of the steps are increasing because the data become sparser as duration increases. This choice appears to represent a good balance between flexibility and tractability. (Even so, the baseline hazard rate is very imprecisely estimated for the last step, representing weeks fifty to sixty.)
Assuming that the baseline hazard functions are constant within each step but vary across steps, let us define r k and j k as r k ϭ log r 0 (t) and j k ϭ log j 0 (t) for time t within step k, k ϭ 1, . . . , 12. Note that r 0 (t) and j 0 (t) must be positive, whereas the r k 's and j k 's are unrestricted. Then, r 1 , . . . , r 12 are twelve free parameters characterizing the recall baseline hazard function, and j 1 , . . . , j 12 are twelve free parameters characterizing the new job baseline hazard function. From equations (1) and (2), we have, for k ϭ 1, . . . , 12,
Now, let us write down the likelihood contribution of each observation according to the duration and outcome of its unemployment spell. An observation will take one of the following three forms:
(i) An unemployment spell is terminated due to recall in the tth time interval. In this case, we assign to the observation Pr(t Ϫ 1 Ͻ T r Յ t,T j Ͼ T r ), which will be bounded by
Since the length of an interval in our data is just one week and, accordingly, a worker's chance of receiving both a recall and an acceptable new job offer in the same interval is quite small, all three probabilities will be approximately equal. While the two bounds are easy to compute, the true probability is relatively involved to compute (see Han & Hausman, 1990; Fallick, 1991; McCall, 1996) . So, we approximate the true probability
(ii) An unemployment spell is terminated due to taking a new job in the tth time interval. In this case, we assign to the observation Pr(T r Ͼ T j ,t Ϫ 1 Ͻ T j Յ t), which will be bounded by Pr(T r Ͼ t,t Ϫ 1 Ͻ T j Յ t) and Pr(T r Ͼ t Ϫ 1, t Ϫ 1 Ͻ T j Յ t). We will approximate the true probability Pr(
An unemployment spell is still going on at the end of the tth interval. In this case, we assign to the observation Pr(T r Ͼ t,T j Ͼ t).
As mentioned above, for those workers unemployed due to plant closings or the ending of temporary or seasonal jobs, we assume that the probability of recall is 0 throughout the unemployment spell. If such a spell is terminated due to taking a new job in the tth time interval, we assign Pr(
On the other hand, if such a spell is still going on at the end of the tth interval, we assign Pr(T r Ͼ t,T j Ͼ t) ϭ Pr(T j Ͼ t).
To derive the probabilities in (i)-(iii) above from the hazard rates specified in equation (3), it is useful to define the integrated hazard rates, R(t͉z, e) ϭ ͵ 0 t r(u͉z, e) du and (u͉z, v) du, for the recall and the new job hazard rates, respectively. Assuming that z is constant within each week (which is the case in our data), these integrations reduce to summations by virtue of the assumed step nature of the baseline hazard functions, 
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Recall that T r and T j are correlated through the search strategies of laid-off workers as well as through heterogeneity across workers. If our model is well specified, in the sense that these relationships are fully reflected in the specification of r(t͉z, e) and j (t͉z, v) , then it is reasonable to assume that T r and T j are independent given r(t͉z, e) and j (t͉z, v) .
Under this assumption of conditional independence, we have
Pr͑T r Ͼ t,T j Ͼ t͉z,e,v͒ ϭ S r ͑t͉z,e͒S j ͑t͉z,v͒.
We do not observe the realization of (e, v), so we must take the expectation of the above quantities with respect to the stochastic nature of (e, v) . Assume that e and v follow a discrete bivariate distribution that takes value (e l , v m ) with probability p lm , l, m ϭ 1, . . . , M. Here, M denotes the number of support points for each of e and v. This approach has been advocated by Heckman and Singer (1984) . We estimate the model with M ϭ 1 (no unobserved heterogeneity), M ϭ 2, M ϭ 3, and M ϭ 4, and choose an "optimal" M according to the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (for example, Amemiya, 1985) . Because 0 Յ p lm Յ 1 (l, m ϭ 1, . . . , M), for computational convenience we represent p lm 's in terms of q lm 's as follows:
The advantage of this representation is that q lm is not
p lm ϭ 1, so a normalization is necessary, and we choose to impose q 11 ϭ 0.
Some normalization is also required to estimate the overall level of each hazard rate, as the "intercepts" in the baseline hazard rates, the constant terms in x and z, and the unobserved heterogeneity terms (e and v) are redundant if left unrestricted. We use the baseline hazard function to estimate the overall level of each hazard rate, and impose restrictions on the other two "intercepts," by excluding the constant term from both x and z and setting e 1 ϭ v 1 ϭ 0.
By taking the expectation with respect to e and v, one derives
These unconditional (with respect to e and v) probabilities will form our likelihood function. The resulting likelihood function will be a function of ␤, ␥, a, r k 's, j k 's, e l 's, v m 's, and q lm 's, with the normalizations e 1 ϭ 0, v 1 ϭ 0, and q 11 ϭ 0. To summarize, the recall hazard rate and the new job hazard rate are related through two channels: (i) individual optimization implies a theoretical relationship across time and across individuals, as predicted by the search model; and (ii) heterogeneity across individuals and jobs may induce a nontheoretical relationship directly. The first channel will be captured by the sign of a. We expect a to be negative, implying that when the recall hazard rate is lower, due either to the passage of time since the layoff or to individual or job characteristics, the new job hazard rate is higher as the worker adjusts his new job search behavior. The second channel, individual heterogeneity, will be captured in two ways. For measured heterogeneity z, we allow differential impacts of numerous individual covariates in the two hazards: ␤ and ␥ are not restricted to be equal for the variables in x. For unmeasured heterogeneity, we model (e, v) as following a general discrete bivariate distribution, which allows unmeasured heterogeneity to affect the two hazards differently. If the type of person who is more likely to be THE RECALL AND NEW JOB SEARCH OF LAID-OFF WORKERSrecalled to his previous job is less likely to find a new job for reasons not related to his optimal new job search strategy, holding measured heterogeneity constant, then we would expect e and v to be negatively correlated.
Once we estimate the model, we will be interested in (i) the temporal patterns in r k 's and j k 's, that is, duration dependence; (ii) the theoretical relationship between r(t͉x, e) and j (j͉z, v) , that is, the coefficient a; (iii) the relationship between ␤ and ␥; and (iv) the joint distribution of e and v (including the "optimal" value for M).
Before moving on to describe the data, we note that an alternative empirical strategy would be to control for the direct effects of heterogeneity in estimating the recall and new job hazards, but to attempt to avoid confusing the nontheoretical and theoretical relationships between the two hazards by estimating the influence of changes in the recall hazard on the new job hazard rate only over the course of an unemployment spell, while leaving aside the influence on the new job hazard of differences from person to person in recall hazard schedules.
In work not reported here, we pursued this strategy. That is, we estimated a model in which only the baseline recall hazard rate, stripped of all heterogeneity terms, can influence the new job hazard rate directly via the term that takes the coefficient a. The estimates described a negative theoretical relationship between the two hazards over the course of a spell of unemployment. However, the finding was fragile and not statistically significant at conventional significance levels. We attribute this to not having enough variation over time in recall hazard rates to allow us to convincingly identify the theoretical negative relationship by looking at the time variation alone. One has to additionally make use of the cross-sectional variation, as in this paper.
III. Data
Our data are drawn from waves XIV, XV, and XVI (interview years 1981-1983) of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the same source used by Katz (1986) , Han and Hausman (1990) , and Idson and Valletta (1996) . Our sample comprises heads of households who lost a job due to plant closings, the ending of seasonal or temporary jobs, or because they were laid off (either permanently or temporarily) or fired. Each observation refers to the last spell of unemployment experienced during the year previous to the interview, or else to a spell of unemployment that was ongoing at the time of the interview. Specifically, those who were employed or on temporary layoff at the time of the interview were asked, referring to their last spell of unemployment in the calendar year previous to the interview, "How many weeks was it before you returned to work?" They were then asked whether that spell of unemployment ended by returning to the same employer. Answers to these two questions allow us to assign a value to the unemployment duration, and to distinguish between spells leading to recalls and spells leading to new jobs. 4 Those who were unemployed (and not on temporary layoff) at the time of the interview were asked, "How long have you been looking for work?" When available, we used the answers to these questions as the spell durations, which are right-censored. In the case of those still on temporary layoff at the date of the interview, however, durations were approximated by subtracting the reported month in which the spell began from the interview month. 5 We further restricted the sample to people who were between 21 and 64 years of age at the time of the interview, who were in the labor force every year from 1980 to 1983 and who were not exclusively self-employed during those years, and to observations that were not missing data for any of the variables described below. We artificially censored spells at sixty weeks of unemployment: any observations with reported durations of sixty weeks or more were treated as still unemployed after 59 weeks. The questions do not allow us to identify with confidence spells with durations of zero weeks. Therefore, we also retain in the sample only unemployment spells that are reported to have lasted at least one week, and renormalized all the durations so that, for computational purposes, they span zero to 59 weeks. Thus, the estimated hazard for the first week really refers to the hazard for the second week, and so on.
In the end, we were left with a sample of 1,403 observations, 274 of which ended in a new job, 718 of which ended in a recall (that is, a return to the same employer), and 411 of which were still unemployed (censored) at the time of the survey or were artificially censored at 59 weeks. Of the total of 1,403 observations, 156 began with a plant closing or a temporary or seasonal job ending, and are accordingly assumed to have recall hazard rates of zero throughout the spell. 6 The explanatory variables are as follows. All but "temp/ seasonal job ended" and "plant closed" appear in both hazard functions. That is, z includes all the variables below, whereas x includes all the variables other than "temp/ seasonal job ended" and "plant closed," which enter the recall hazard only through the "nohope" variable. The 4 Since those on temporary layoff at the time of the interview may have completed the last spell of unemployment in the previous year, they are not necessarily on temporary layoff for the purposes of our sample. 5 The nature of the questions is such that, in some cases, the reason for the separation (which we used to distinguish job losses from quits) may not refer to the same episode that generated the recorded spell of unemployment. This is not likely to be often true, but does add some uncertainty to our results. 6 In practice, the spell of unemployment whose cause the survey identifies is not necessarily the last spell of unemployment in the calendar year previous to the interview (the latter being the spell to which the duration measures refer). As a consequence, a small number of observations who reported a plant closing or a temporary or seasonal job ending also reported having returned to the same employer following the last spell in the previous year. We coded such observations as normal layoffs since the answers given probably referred to different spells. Table 1 shows the sample mean and the sample standard deviation of each explanatory variable used in the paper.
IV. Results
As we have emphasized, adequate controls for heterogeneity are important for testing the theoretical implications of search theory using data on single unemployment spells for many individuals. We assume that u and v follow a discrete bivariate distribution with the same number of points of support for each term. We experimented with one, two, three, and four points of support. Some unobserved heterogeneity is clearly indicated. The Schwarz Bayesian information criterion strongly recommends two points of support (SBIC ϭ Ϫ4,093 for two points vs. Ϫ4,213 for three points). (The Akaike information criterion is indifferent between two and three points.) Adding a fourth point of support to each hazard's heterogeneity term improved the log likelihood trivially. Accordingly, we will feature the estimates from the mixed proportional hazard model allowing for two points of support of unmeasured heterogeneity, shown in table 2. The values for e 1 and v 1 are normalized to 0 and the signficance of the e 2 and v 2 terms attests to the importance of unobserved heterogeneity. We tested the validity of the proportional hazard assumption using the method suggested by Ryu (1994) . That is, one can test the proportionality assumption by testing the equivalence of two sets of estimates, one estimated using the original weekly duration data and the other estimated using a more aggregated version of the same duration data. For this test, we aggregated the unemployment duration data according to the baseline steps. According to the joint chi-square test, we cannot reject the proportionality assumption. Judging by individual t-tests, only the local unemployment rate turns out to have a nonproportional impact on the new job hazard rates. It significantly depresses the new job hazard rates at an earlier period after layoff. But such an effect dies out over time, generating nonproportionality. We cannot reject proportionality for any other coefficients. 7 Among the explanatory variables, note that membership in a union increases the recall hazard while decreasing the new job hazard. 8 Job tenure significantly increases the recall (Notes: 1. Hazard specifications in each week in step t are r(t) ϭ e rtϩx␤ϩe and j(t) ϭ e jtϩz␥ϩa*e rtϩx␤ ϩv where the first three steps are each two weeks long, the second three are three weeks long, the third three are four weeks long, and the final three are eleven weeks long. 2. Variables statistically significant at 5% level are in boldface.)
Recall ( hazard rates, whereas its impact on the new job hazard rates is negative but not statistically significant. Note also that having lost one's job due to a plant closing has a significantly positive effect on the new job hazard rate (one-sided test at 5% level). But, having lost one's job due to ending of a seasonal or temporary job-a variable that has appeared in the literature as having a positive influence on new job finding-is not estimated to have a significant effect on the new job hazard rate. This would not imply that those displaced by ending of seasonal or temporary jobs behave no differently than those laid off for other reasons, however. They all have zero recall chances (by assumption), and this increases their new job hazards so long as the coefficient a is negative.
By comparing estimated coefficients for each of the individual covariates in the recall and new job hazard functions, we observe that with respect to several characteristics (namely, sex, race, UI recipiency, and geography), people who are faster to find new jobs are also faster to be recalled, a positive relationship between the two hazard rates arising from these particular types of heterogeneity. This contrasts with the estimated effects of union membership, job tenure, and plant closings, which, as noted above, have opposite signs for the two hazards.
The model included interactions for UI receipt at weeks 26 and 39. The usual spikes seen at the UI benefit exhaustion points (26th and 39th weeks) are confirmed by the positive coefficient estimates of the UI interaction terms at 26 and 39 weeks (coefficients of ui26 and ui39), the first two of which are significantly positive.
In this model, the theoretical coefficient a is estimated to be significantly negative, but small. A sense of the size of this estimated effect of the prospect for recall on new-job finding can be gathered from figures 1 and 2. The figures present the recall and new job hazard rates in percentage terms (after exponentiating the log hazard rates), at the mean of the explanatory variables. The solid line in figure 2 shows how the estimated new job hazard changes over the course of a spell of unemployment for an individual with no chance of recall at any time (that is, 1 nohope ϭ 1). The dashed line shows how the estimated new job hazard changes over a spell for an individual with the estimated recall hazard depicted in figure 1 . The difference between the lines reflects our estimate of a.
The importance of our treatment of unobserved heterogeneity for this result is demonstrated in table 3. The table shows the estimates of the theoretical coefficient for the four different specifications that allow for successively greater degrees of unobserved heterogeneity by allowing successively more points of support for its discrete distribution.
In the specification with just one point of support for the unobserved heterogeneity term, which is to say, the specification that assumes no unobserved heterogeneity, the estimate of the a coefficient is far more negative than in those specifications wherein unmeasured heterogeneity is taken into account. Once some unobserved heterogeneity is allowed (that is, at least two points of support), the estimate is not very sensitive to the the number of support points assumed. 9 All in all, while our empirical results support the prediction of the theory that there should be a theoretical negative relationship between the recall and the new job hazard rates, the estimated relationship is not strong.
Clearly, then, one must adequately control for both measured and unmeasured heterogeneity in order to identify the theoretical relationship between these two avenues for leaving unemployment. Drawing general inferences about behavior from data on single spells of many heterogeneous individuals is a challenging task, and we do not doubt that better data are likely to be more useful than better econometric techniques for estimating the theoretical implications of job search models, a situation familiar to researchers in many areas. (For example, see LaLonde, 1986 ; on evaluating the effectiveness of job training programs.) Nevertheless, we 9 We were unable to estimate the standard error of the coefficient in the case with four points of support. 
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obtain empirical results consistent with the theoretical predictions by applying econometric tools to the sort of lessthan-ideal data with which one is most often confronted. The sensitivity of our findings to the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity, and their robustness to varying the degree of unobserved heterogeneity, gives us confidence that our procedure was adequate to the task.
Figures 1 and 2 also indicate that we find limited duration dependence in the hazard rates. The new job hazard rate is more or less increasing over the course of the unemployment spell, although not uniformly so. The estimated recall hazard rate exhibits negative duration dependence, as expected. However, the recall hazard rate begins to decline only after about six months following a layoff; the rate is flat, or even increasing, over the first six months of unemployment. This suggests why, as noted above, it is very difficult to identify the theoretical influence of recall chances on the new job hazard by looking at the relationship over time alone. Cross-sectional variation is critical.
V. Our Estimates Compared to Katz and Meyer's
Except in the case where only observed heterogeneity is modeled, our estimate of the theoretical impact of recall prospects on the new job hazard appears to be considerably smaller than that reported in Katz and Meyer (1990; KM hereafter) or Anderson (1992) . Comparing the estimates is not straightforward, however. KM's measure of recall expectations is a zero-one indicator variable for expecting recall or not expecting recall. But it is not clear just what it means to "expect recall" in this context. Neither the likelihood of recall nor the time frame is specified, and they are measured only at the onset of a spell of unemployment. 10 In contrast, our model deals with a recall hazard rate that translates into a specific probability of recall within any specified period, and that can vary over the course of the unemployment spell. Because of these differences, comparing our estimates to KM's is best done by example. The task is made easier by supposing that recall hazard rates are constant over the spell (which is not too far removed from the degree of duration dependence that we estimate over much of a spell).
According to KM's estimates, a person who expects recall has a new job hazard rate that is 60% to 75% as large as a person who does not expect recall. To find a similarly sized reduction in the new job hazard with our model and estimates, we can compare someone with a constant recall hazard rate of 40% to 50% to an otherwise identical person with a recall hazard rate of 0 (that is, having no recall prospects at all, such as would be true if 1 nohope ϭ 1).
In this example, then, we equate someone with a recall hazard rate of 0 (in our model) with someone who does not expect recall (in KM's model). As shaky as this equation may be, still trickier is how well a recall hazard rate of 40% to 50% corresponds to expecting recall. One way to guage this is to observe that a constant recall hazard rate of this magnitude would imply that an individual has a 99% chance of being recalled by six to ten weeks of unemployment, with a mean time-until-recall of two to two and a half weeks. If this is a good description of the typical recall prospect faced by someone who expects recall at the time of the layoff, then our estimates are of a similar magnitude to KM's. As an alternative, if one thinks that someone expecting recall at the time of the layoff corresponds better to his having, say, a 99% chance of being recalled within a year and a mean time-until-recall of ten weeks, then a better comparison in our model would be with an individual with a constant recall hazard rate of 10%. According to our estimates, such an individual would have a new job hazard that is 92% as large as a person with no prospects for recall, a much smaller difference than that estimated by KM, although still enough to raise a person's mean time-until-new-job by 9%.
Looking at these implied durations, if we ourselves were asking the survey question in KM's data, we would have in mind a recall hazard rate more in the neighborhood of 10% than of 50% when we asked whether the respondent expects to be recalled. Moreover, the mean duration of unemployment of those in KM's sample who (i) expected to be recalled; (ii) were, in fact, recalled; and (iii) whose spells were not censored, was 8.2 weeks, closer to our example of a 10% hazard rate than to a 50% hazard rate. All in all, then, we are inclined to interpret our estimate of the theoretical response to expectations of recall as being much smaller than KM's.
Assuming that our interpretation of "expects recall" is in the right neighborhood, how can we reconcile the two sets of empirical results, taking both at face value? Note that the expectations in KM's data are ex ante and subjective, while the estimated probabilities in our model are ex post and objective. If the subjective probabilities of laid-off workers are not fully sensitive to their objective probabilities, then their job search behavior will be more sensitive to the subjective expectations in KM's data than to the objective recall hazard rates estimated in our model. This interpretation is consistent with the result in KM that having been given a definite recall date (as opposed to simply expecting to be recalled) is associated with a much higher probability of recall, but it is not estimated to have a statistically significant effect on the new job hazard rate. Either laid-off 10 The survey question is, "Do you expect to be called back to work by any of your past employers?" (KM, p. 978). 
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workers are not responding rationally to information about their prospects for recall, or else they are poorly informed. The notion that they are poorly informed is supported by the observation that in KM's data the fraction of workers who expected recall is substantially greater than the fraction who ended up being recalled. Poor information, then, appears to cause many laid-off workers to adopt inefficient job search strategies.
Of course, it is also possible that the difference in magnitude between our results and KM's stems from differences in data quality or econometric technique. On the one hand, we may, in the end, do an inadequate job of estimating ex post recall hazard rates or identifying the effects of the recall hazard on the new job hazard (see above). On the other hand, KM's treatment of unobserved heterogeneity may be inadequate. In particular, KM assume that unobserved heterogeneity is distributed according to a gamma distribution and that it is independent across risks. They found that their results were not very sensitive to whether they controlled for unobserved heterogeneity in this fashion. Perhaps those assumptions are overly restrictive. In the current study, we assume that unobserved heterogeneity has a discrete distribution, which Heckman and Singer (1984) argue is better than the gamma assumption. We also allow the unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated across the two risks. In sharp contrast to KM's results, we found that the estimate of the influence of the recall hazard on the new job hazard rate is ten times larger when we do not control for unobserved heterogeneity as when we do (table 3) . If the difference is due to our less restrictive assumptions, then it may be that KM's results overstate the influence of recall prospects. 11
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we find evidence of a small negative theoretical relationship between the hazard rates for recall and new job finding. However, although comparisons are not straightforward, this estimated relationship appears to be much weaker than that reported in Katz and Meyer (1990) or Anderson (1992) . The discrepancy highlights the possibility that laid-off workers either do not rationally adjust their new job search efforts to variation in their prospects for recall, or are poorly informed about their recall prospects. In either case, new job search is not as active and unemployment spells are longer than they would be if the workers were both rational and well informed. However, the policy implications of these two possibilities differ. If irrationality is the problem, it is not clear that policymakers can do much to improve the situation, while if poor information and the resulting exaggerated expectation of the recall prospects are the problem, then policy may be well directed toward improving the flow of information, such as encouraging employers to provide a record of the quantity and speed of recalls during past episodes of layoffs.
In addition, we find positive duration dependence in the new job hazard, and some negative duration dependence in the recall hazard, once heterogeneity has been accounted for. However, to our surprise, we find no indication that the recall hazard rate declines over the first six months of an unemployment spell.
